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EDITORIAL NOTES
ALIENABILITY OF CONTINGENT REMAINDERS.

The question of the alienability inter vivos of a contingent remainder was before the Court of Appeals for the First Appellate
District in Pollock v. Brayton.'

2
It was disposed of as follows:

"We are of the opinion that at the time of making the deed
Mrs. Gould did not have any interest in the property that she
could convey."
At the common law a contingent remainder was not alienable
inter vivos,' although there was authority the other way when the
only uncertainty was in the event upon which the remainder was
limited to take effect. 4 This distinction, however, "has often been
overlooked or denied." 5
In most, if not all, jurisdictions in this country, in the absence
of statute, contingent remainders are still inalienable inter vivos. 6
"This is a survival of the feudal land law."
129 Ohio App. 296 (1928).

'Ibid., at p. 300.
3Lampet's Case, 10 Coke 51 (1635); SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE,
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS (4th ed.), 366.

239; FiARNIC,

44 KENT'S COM., 261, 262.

'Moore v. Littell, 41 N. Y. 66 (1869).
'Hudson, The Transfer of Remainders, 26 YALE L. J. 24 (1916).
IKALES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2nd ed. 1920), p. 335.
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Although it was held that a contingent remainder could not be
transferred inter vivos, nevertheless, if the contingent remainderman attempted to alienate and the remainder subsequently vested
in his lifetime, the remainder under certain circumstances passed
by way of estoppel to the alienee.8 "In the United States either
by statute or decision, the same effect is generally given to deeds
containing covenants of warranty."' It was so held in the instant
case.
But suppose the remainder does not vest until after the death
of the contingent remainderman who has attempted to transfer
it by warranty deed. Is the grantee protected by estoppel as
against the heir of such remainderman? Professor Kales argues
10
that "on principle" the heir is not bound by the warranty.
1
It has been so held in New York. It was early held in this state
that, in the case of an attempt by a tenant in tail to convey a
fee simple by warranty deed, the heirs of the warrantor were not
1
estopped because their title did not come from him as its source. "
This would seem to indicate that an heir whose title to property
has its source in an ancestor who made an attempted conveyance
thereof by warranty deed, is estopped by the warranty."a The
well-known case of Golladay v. Knock, 3 supports the same in4
ference, and it has been so held in Pennsylvania."
If, then, the title of the heir of a contingent remainderman is
traced from the latter as it source, and not from the.first purchaser as at common law, it is not unlikely that our courts would
hold the heir estopped. That, as to vested interests, the title of
an heir is traced, not from the first purchaser, but from the one
last "entitled", has been held in other jurisdictions under statutes
of descent similar to ours. 5 As said by Professor Kales, "since the
8

bid., sec. 321.
gIbid., p. 337, n. 7.
lIbid., sec. 322.
"Jackson v. Littell, 56 N. Y. 108 (1874).
12Pollock v. Speidel, 17 Ohio St. 439 (1867).
121cf. Groves v. Groves, 65 Ohio St. 442, 448, 62 N. E. 1044 (1902).

"They

stand as heirs . . . and . . . are therefore bound by the acts of their ancestors

in relation to the property they seek to inherit."
13235 Ill. 412, 85 N. E. 649 (1908).
"4Carson v. New Bellevue Cemetery Co., 104 Pa. St. 575 (1883).
15KALus, FUTURE INTERESTS, sec. 381.
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mode of tracing descent from the person last entitled depends
upon the statute on descent, there can be no ground for saying
that the descent of reversions and vested remainders is to be
traced in one way and the descent of contingent remainders and
contingent executory interests in another." 16 Nevertheless, in
Georgia, "where the descent of reversions and vested remainders
is from the person last entitled, the descent of a contingent remainder or contingent executory interest is traced from the first
purchaser at the time the contingency happens." 7 There is,
perhaps, an intimation in Tharp v. United States Fidelity &'
Guaranty Company"8 that this latter view would be adopted in
Ohio.
There is considerable dicta in Ohio to the effect that contingent
remainders are alienable inter vivos.' 9 More recently it has been
held that a contingent remainder is not alienable by quit claim
deed, 20 and the decision would seem to rest rather on the nature
of the interest than the character of the instrument.
The inalienability of contingent remainders reduces the mobility of real estate. Considerations of convenience lead to the
belief, which appears to be generally accepted, that real estate
should be freely marketable. This had led to the enactment of
statutes in many states making contingent remainders alienable
2
inter vivos. '
If not only a contingent remainderman who attempts to convey
by warranty deed, but his heir as well, is estopped by the warranty,
it probably makes no great difference whether contingent remainders are or are not said to be alienable. The effect of the
warranty upon the heir, however, has not been determined in
this state. In any event there would seem to be no reason why
the courts should feel bound by the old rule that contingent remainders are not alienable (the reasons for which have long since
161bid., see. 382.
1

Ibid.

182 Ohio App. 28 (1913).
"jWhite,
Some Ohio Problems as to Future Interests in Land, I CIN. L. Ruv.
36 (1927).

2uLaver v. Kreiter, 7 Ohio App. 441 (1917).
"Sec

POWELL, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS, 287 (1928);

supra, notc 19, at 56.

White, op. cit.,
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disappeared),22 in the face of what appears to be accepted as the
public interest to the contrary. Chief Judge Cardozo has said:"3
"I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of
justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation
in frank avowal and full abandonment. We have had to do this
sometimes in the field of constitutional law. Perhaps we should
do so oftener in fields of private law where considerations of
social utility are not so aggressive and insistent. There should
be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position when the
rule to be discarded may not reasonably be supposed to have
determined the conduct of the litigants, and particularly when
in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which
have gained a new significance or development with the progress
of the years."
Doubtless it may be objected that this is a "rule of property".
It seems improbable, however, that any hardship or unsettlement
of titles could result, the prevention of which must be at the
bottom of the greater zeal for stare decisis in that regard.
JOSEPH O'MEARA, JR.
WILLIAM K. DIVERS.

OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT LAWS OF A
GENERAL NATURE SHALL HAVE A UNIFORM
OPERATION THROUGHOUT THE STATE.

Statutes creating a board of library trustees in cities of the

"first grade of the first class", which were the survival of a day
when "classification" of cities on the basis of population was
used to put practically every large city in a different class, were
held recently by the Supreme Court of Ohio to be in violation of
Section 26 of Article II, of the Ohio constitution, requiring laws
of a general nature to have uniform operation throughout the
state.' The supreme court affirmed the common pleas court and
the court of appeals of Hamilton County, which also had held
that the statutes were unconstitutional.
At the time of the
22

White, op. cit., supra, note 19, at 39; cf. Jeffers v. Lampson, 10 Ohio St.
101 (1859).
2NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150.

'Brown v. State, (1929) 120 0. S. 297.

